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Rape-Related Pregnancies:  
The Need to Create Stronger Protections for 
the Victim-Mother and Child 
 
Margot E.H. Stevens* 
About one in six women in the United States will be a victim of rape. For many of these 
women, the rape does not end there—this crime against their body will result in an 
unplanned pregnancy. In recent years, rape awareness has increased both in the 
government and among the public: a new federal definition of rape encompasses a 
broader spectrum of victims and pregnancy resulting from rape was splashed across 
national headlines. But this is not enough. Most states lack sufficient legal protections for 
a pregnant rape victim: criminal prosecutions and convictions for rape are rare, and 
many states lack an efficient means through which a victim could terminate her rapist’s 
parental rights over the child. This Note illuminates this legislative omissions by 
discussing the current statutory schemes in effect and illustrates how judicial applications 
of these statutes leave many victims and their children without sufficient legal processes. 
To resolve this inadequacy, this Note suggests changes to the parental rights termination 
statutes, particularly concerning pregnancies resulting from rape, to create a more 
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Rape is a serious concern in the United States, but its negative reach 
extends well beyond the criminal system into the civil system and 
deteriorates one of the building blocks of our nation: the family. A notable 
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percentage of U.S. citizens believe, however, that pregnancy will not, or 
cannot, result from rape, so that rape and families do not belong in the 
same discussion. “Legitimate rape” made national headlines during the 
2012 election campaigns, beginning with Representative Todd Akin’s 
declaration that “[i]f it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to 
try to shut the whole thing down.”1 Akin was not the only candidate to 
publicly disclose his views on rape. Fellow Republican candidate Richard 
Mourdock also spoke out about the legitimacy of rape-related 
pregnancies.2 These remarks were followed by a marked decrease in the 
public’s approval of these candidates,3 indicating that the general 
population is both sensitive and reactive to the issue of rape and rape-
related pregnancies. These statements reignited the passion behind 
public discourse on rape and reproductive rights.4 Given the social 
climate surrounding these issues, now is the perfect time to change the 
legal and social treatment of these issues. This Note hopes builds on this 
receptive social atmosphere and advocates for a change in the treatment 
of rape-related pregnancies, specifically concerning the assignment of 
parental rights to the rapist fathers.5 
Part I addresses the complexities within the term “rape” itself. The 
variety and range of definitions provided for the word inevitably results 
in inconsistencies in identifying the instances and perpetrators thereof. 
Part II discusses how the variations in defining rape contributes to the 
inconsistencies in the reporting rates of rape. Part III then identifies the 
parties involved in instances of rape-related pregnancies: the father, the 
mother, the child, and the State. Each of these groups has policy interests 
at stake surrounding the treatment of rape in the civil system for rape-
related pregnancies. These interests must be balanced when constructing 
statutory schemes, and this Note proposes that this balance should be 
redistributed to more strongly protect the interests of the victim and her 
child, thereby matching society’s policy goals. 
 
 1. Lori Moore, The Statement and the Reaction, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 2012, at A13 (reporting 
former Representative Todd Akin’s belief that there can be no rape-related pregnancies because the 
female body is capable of preventing conception if it was truly a rape). 
 2. Michael McAuliff, Richard Mourdock on Abortion: Pregnancy From Rape is ‘Something God 
Intended’, Huffington Post (Oct. 23, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/ 
richard-mourdock-abortion_n_2007482.html (quoting Mourdock as saying rape-related pregnancies 
are “something that God intended to happen”). 
 3. See Moore, supra note 1 (outlining public reaction following Akin’s comments). 
 4. See, e.g., Jeff Black, Rape Remarks Sink Two Republican Senate Hopefuls, NBC News 
(Nov. 7, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/07/14980822-rape-remarks-
sink-two-republican-senate-hopefuls (stating that the projected failures of these two candidates can be 
attributed to the rape comments). 
 5. This Note often refers to the biological fathers of these children as rapists, but the United 
States does have a presumption of innocence until proven guilty, so using this terminology prior to a 
criminal adjudication is not entirely proper. This Note uses the term, however, to keep the reader in 
the frame of mind of the circumstance to which this discussion applies. 
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Part IV addresses the reproductive decisions that may face a victim 
upon becoming pregnant: adoption, abortion, or keeping the child. With 
each available decision, different parental rights attach to the biological 
father, arguably exceeding acceptable societal norms. Part V outlines the 
progression of parental rights in the courts, providing the framework 
upon which current laws are based. Part VI describes some of the 
methods by which states have confronted this overextension of rights 
through state law—by restricting decisionmaking abilities or limiting 
custody rights, for example—but notes that there are no consistent legal 
protections for the mother or child. Following the discussion of the 
different types of state law, Part VII reviews examples from case law to 
further highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of different legal 
mechanisms as applied to rape-related pregnancies. 
Finally, this Note proposes stronger protections for the rape victim 
and her child that would still protect some interests of the biological 
father and effectuate the goals of the State. These legislative enactments 
are part of the larger goal of this Note: to advocate for more consistent 
treatment of parental rights throughout all the jurisdictions in this country 
of rape-related pregnancies and greater predictability for the outcome of 
parental rights challenges. Implementation of a stronger standard for the 
treatment of parental rights of children conceived by rape will better 
protect victims and their children. 
I.  Defining Rape 
Throughout history, rape has had a fluid definition, undergoing many 
changes resulting from shifting social norms.6 The definition of rape is still 
not consistent across the United States; most states, as well as the federal 
government, have distinct definitions of the word.7 Different legal 
 
 6. For a comprehensive look at the changing definition of rape throughout American history, 
see generally Estelle B. Freedman, Redefining Rape: Sexual Violence in the Era of Suffrage 
and Segregation (2013). 
 7. In 2012, the United States federal government issued a new official definition of “rape,” to be 
used by all federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice, 
in conjunction with the Uniform Crime Report System. See Criminal Justice Info. Servs. Division, Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation, UCR Program Changes Definition of Rape (2012), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/cjis-link/march-2012/ucr-program-changes-definition-of-rape. 
This new definition of “rape” is now the “[p]enetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or 
anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the 
consent of the victim.” Id. This new definition is more expansive because it removes gender references 
and increases the categories of invalid consent to include additional forms of incapacitation and age. 
Id. Arguably, the most important improvement is the removal of the physical resistance requirement 
as connected with denial of consent. Id. 
The previous definition used in the Uniform Crime Reporting System was “the carnal knowledge of 
a female forcibly and against her will.” Criminal Justice Info. Servs., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 
Crime in the United States, 2011: Forcible Rape (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/violent-crime/ forcible-rape. When applying this 
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definitions of rape contribute to the inconsistent protections victims 
receive, as certain acts may not be criminalized in all jurisdictions. 
The inconsistency exhibits the broadness of the term, which can 
include different acts performed by different people. Thus, it is difficult 
to ascertain an all-encompassing definition of the term. For example, the 
California Penal Code defines rape as “an act of sexual intercourse 
accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any 
of the following circumstances,” including but not limited to lack of 
consent, against the victim’s will, by means of intoxication, or when a 
person is unconscious.8 California also criminalizes the rape of a spouse in 
a separate statute, listing similar elements of an act of sexual intercourse 
against a person’s will, without consent, including intoxication and 
unconsciousness.9 Similarly, Idaho defines rape as “the penetration, 
however slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening with the perpetrator’s 
penis accomplished with a female.”10 The Idaho statute also includes 
elements of age, lack of consent, resistance, unconsciousness, and false 
beliefs.11 Comparing the language of these two statutes emphasizes how 
the use of different language for certain acts can encompass the same 
underlying idea. This difference illustrates the importance of adopting 
inclusive, rather than exclusive, statutory language to ensure that 
arguments of “legitimate rape” do not preclude some women from 
receiving equal treatment in the courts. 
Legal terms undergo further variation in how the court applies them. 
Judges often interpret statutory language by applying the particular facts 
of the case at hand and determining which actions satisfy the elements of 
the crime without clearly defining the underlying concept. A good 
example of the evolving nature of rape can be found in the seminal case 
criminalizing marital rape. People v. Liberta redefined the element of 
consent (central to the determination of rape)12 by applying a victim-
protective understanding of consent to married couples, eliminating the 
defense that marriage creates eternal consent to sexual activity between 
 
definition, an estimated 83,425 forcible rapes were reported to law enforcement in 2011. Id. Following the 
implementation of the updated definition, more rapes will be included in the data, returning more 
accurate estimates of the occurrence of rape in the United States. Id. 
 8. Cal. Penal Code § 261 (West 2014). 
 9. Id. § 262. It is important to note that marital rape has been illegal in every state and 
Washington D.C. since 1993. Marital Rape, Rape, Abuse & Incest Nat’l Network, 
http://www.rainn.org/public-policy/sexual-assault-issues/marital-rape (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). States 
have criminalized marital rape either by repealing marital rape exemptions or by codifying marital 
rape as a separate crime. See Steven A. Morley & Jay Shapiro, 1-7 The Prosecution and Defense of Sex 
Crimes § 7.03 Marital Rape (Lexis 2012). 
 10. Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6101 (2013). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1095 (1986). 
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spouses.13 The New York Court of Appeals found the idea of implied 
consent to unwanted sexual activity absurd, and came down strongly 
against the notion of implied consent in any context: 
Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. 
Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. 
Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity 
of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and 
psychic harm. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and 
absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never 
been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on 
demand. . . . A married woman has the same right to control her own 
body as does an unmarried woman.14 
The Liberta court redirected the focus from the relationship between 
the parties to the act itself, nullifying arguments of implied consent 
stemming from a preexisting intimate relationship. Its language is a 
powerful example of how the operative definition of rape can preclude 
certain groups of victims by the underlying social perspectives. This 
concern is relevant again in light of the above-mentioned “legitimate rape” 
perception. Like Liberta, this Note advocates for a more inclusive 
definition to better protect the victims of the crime. A woman in an 
intimate relationship with her abuser often has a difficult time proving 
that a rape occurred, but focusing on the act itself—rather than the 
relationship between the parties—will eliminate any potential “implied” 
consent and help the victim prove her case.15 Defining rape by the act, and 
consent to those particular acts, would be more protective of the victims 
and help clarify some issues confronting rape-related pregnancies—such as 
proving a rape occurred or removing the rapist’s parental rights over the 
child—and thereby provide consistency in treatment across all 
jurisdictions.16 
 
 13. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984) (finding the marital rape exception in New 
York to be unconstitutional under equal protection, and that only consensual acts are protected by the 
fundamental right to marital privacy). However, some legal theories still preclude rape from including 
a man having intercourse with his wife. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 213.1 (2012). 
 14. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573 (citations omitted). 
 15. Marital rape is often associated with domestic violence; however, there is a split between 
scholars and activists about whether marital rape should be treated under the heading of domestic 
violence or considered its own crime. See, e.g., Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape 
Law’s Failure To Keep Up with Domestic Violence Law, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1819, 1823–24 (2011). 
 16. Statutory rape is beyond the scope of this Note because there are additional issues and policy 
concerns unique to this crime. Statutory rape is the sexual intercourse with any person under a pre-
determined age, thereby implying lack of consent. For example, Georgia defines statutory rape to be 
“when [a person] engages in sexual intercourse with any person under the age of 16 years.” Ga. Code 
Ann. § 16-6-3(a) (2012). Additional considerations when discussing statutory rape are that one party is 
a minor and that there may have been consent to the sexual acts (despite the age restrictions—
although age, like intoxication, is a bar to legal consent). See generally E. Gary Spitko, The 
Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological Mother’s Consent to the 
Biological Father’s Co-parenting of Her Child, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 97 (2006). 
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II.  Occurrence of Rape in the United States 
In 2006, approximately one in six women in the United States had 
been a victim of completed or attempted rape.17 This frequency highlights 
the importance of rape as a public policy concern. The National Crime 
Victimization Survey of 2010, released by the Department of Justice, 
estimated the number of rapes and sexual assaults that occurred in 2010 
to be 188,380, a noticeable increase from 2009.18 The survey further 
reported that 73% of female rape victims knew their rapist prior to the 
rape, and of those, 17% were in an intimate relationship with their 
assailant.19 These figures closely match those from another survey that 
found that 17.6% of rapists were husbands of their victims, 29.4% were 
boyfriends, and only 8.8% were strangers.20 This data uncovers that rape is 
not only committed by strangers, but is often a crime of interrelationship 
abuse. This Note proposes solutions to reflect the reality that many 
women know the man who raped them, whereas most statutes presume 
that rape is a crime committed only by strangers. 
It is estimated that 4.7% of rapes (32,101) result in pregnancy, when 
looking at victims of reproductive age—twelve to forty-five.21 Due to the 
high number of rapes that result in pregnancies, current legal remedies 
that fail to address these circumstances are inadequate and must be 
restructured to be more consistent and predictable. 
III.  Rape-Related Pregnancies and the Related Policy Interests 
Rape-related pregnancies involve many competing interests: the 
penal and public welfare interests of the state, interests of the fathers, 
interests of the women as both mother and victim, and interests of 
children. Due to the significant conflicts between these concerns, any 
legislation or judicial doctrine should conduct a balancing of interests 
test. The following Subparts address the different interests of each group 
that should be considered when discussing rape-related pregnancies. 
A. Interests of the Biological Fathers 
When considering the interests of various groups, it is important to 
remember that even within one classification, the interests may not be 
 
 17. See generally Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Rape Victimization: Findings from the National 
Violence Against Women Survey at iii (2006), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
210346.pdf. 
 18. Jennifer L. Truman, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Crime Victimization Survey: 
Criminal Victimization, 2010 at 9 (2011). This data included victims of both sexes. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Melisa M. Holmes et al., Rape-related Pregnancy: Estimates and Descriptive Characteristics 
from a National Sample of Women, 175 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 320, 322 (1996). 
 21. Id. at 321–22. 
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consistent among all members. This is particularly apparent when 
considering the interests of fathers of rape-related pregnancies. The two 
extremes of the spectrum are (1) the stranger-rapist who selects a victim 
at random, does not get arrested, and is never seen or heard from again, 
and (2) a husband who commits marital rape and is in a legal relationship 
with both mother and his child. An example of a mid-spectrum offense is 
a boyfriend who forces his girlfriend to have sex despite her explicitly 
stating she does not want to. Additionally, some of these men may be 
attempting to avoid any paternal obligations or a stigma of a rape 
accusation and disappear, but others may attempt to secure custody or 
visitation rights.22 
The interests of fathers weigh heavily when applied to the civil law-
based parenting rights and are applicable in any paternity issue, not just 
in rape-related pregnancies. Parental rights take many forms, including 
the right to refuse consent to the adoption of the child, visitation rights, 
custody rights, and decisionmaking rights.23 Attached to these rights are 
obligations, the most important of which is child support payment.24 
Fathers who pursue parental rights are viewed more favorably by the 
courts because they have expressed an interest in their children.25 For 
these interested fathers, there is a strong policy goal in providing ample 
due process and permitting a demonstration of a sincere interest in 
establishing a relationship with the child, as well as providing a forum to 
show reasons why the rape accusation or conviction should not affect 
parental rights. 
The biology-plus standard (requiring a father establish more than a 
mere biological relationship with a child to warrant parental rights),26 as 
 
 22. The interests of the fathers are complex, as it is likely all fathers by way of rape are 
attempting to avoid criminal liability. There are different considerations when looking to the civil 
liabilities of parenting, such as a support obligation and the rights to custody and visitation, which the 
father may want to pursue despite the potentially criminal associations of the conception. 
 23. As seen frequently in child custody cases, there are different rights and obligations a parent 
may obtain. Legal custody of a child includes the authority to make significant decisions on behalf of 
the child in areas like religion, education, and medical decisions. McCarty v. McCarty, 807 A.2d 1211, 
1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). Physical custody involves day-to-day decisionmaking, as well as an 
obligation to provide housing, food, and other such daily care to the child. Id. When a court 
determines the recommended custody determination, the focus is on the best interest of the child. Id. 
at 1215. 
 24. See Cal. Fam. Code § 4053 (West 2012) (“(a) A parent’s first and principle obligation is to 
support his or her minor children according to the parent’s circumstances and station in life[;] (b) Both 
parents are mutually responsible for the support of their children.”); see also infra note 38 (discussing 
the costs of raising a child in a single family home and how child support payments from a second 
parent may be necessary to permit a single parent to raise a child). 
 25. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (“If [the father] grasps that opportunity 
and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the 
parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development.”). 
 26. See infra Part VI (discussing the development of this standard). This standard has been 
established by the Supreme Court to evaluate the parental rights of unwed fathers. “[T]he Court found 
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well as any statutes directing the termination of parental rights, runs the 
risk of blocking the legitimate rights of an interested father. “Thwarted 
fathers” are those who have attempted to develop a relationship with 
their child, or have an honest interest in doing so, but have been unable 
to do so due to external factors such as actions by the mother, adoption 
proceedings, or not being aware of the pregnancy until after the child’s 
birth.27 Without being able to prove more than just a biological link, 
these men risk losing their rights under the biology-plus standard.28 The 
concern about thwarting is significant because the State does not want to 
discourage interested fathers from attempting to establish a legitimate 
relationship with their child under proper circumstances. However, the 
potential risk of awarding parental rights to a rapist, contrary to the 
interests of the mother and child, must also factor in to the overall 
balancing of interests. 
The father is still entitled to due process protections, whether he is a 
rapist or not, during the parental rights hearing. These protections include 
notice of the hearing (if he can be located) and the opportunity to present 
his case. This protection sufficiently recognizes the due process rights of 
the men by providing a platform from which innocent, interested fathers 
may express their views, thereby minimizing thwarting. Fathers are also 
protected by automatic deprivation of rights built into the statutes or 
applicable legal standards. This would avoid abuses in the system by 
requiring a hearing or some other fact-finding determination that rape 
had occurred. This Note suggests mechanisms for judicial hearings to 
protect against overbroad granting of parental rights to the detriment of 
the mother and child, whether those hearings occur in the criminal courts 
for an adjudication of rape or in the civil courts for a termination of 
parental rights. 
In order to appropriately balance the entire spectrum of men who 
have committed rape (be it a stranger, a friend, or a husband), this 
protection should not be too broad. A criminal act should not be 
rewarded with parental rights to any child conceived by rape.29 For those 
innocent fathers or complicated factual situations, a courtroom hearing 
in which evidence is presented to a judge or jury panel may be the best 
 
that something more was necessary in personally association cases, i.e., ‘biology plus.’” Laura Oren, 
The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology ‘Plus’ Defines Relationships; Biology 
Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 47, 48 (2004). A man must “prove the 
biological link plus some kind of an existing relationship” with the child. Id. 
 27. Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-up Pops?: How To Determine When Putative Fathers 
Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 Fam. L.Q. 153, 154 (2006). 
 28. Id. at 159. For a more detailed discussion of these cases and the “biology-plus” standard, and 
how they relate to the parental rights assigned to a father, see infra Part VI. 
 29. Steven A. v. Rickie M., 823 P.2d 1216, 1237 n.14 (Cal. 1992) (finding that fathers through rape do 
not deserve the same protections because the sex was only voluntary for the father but not the mother). 
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protection of due process without overpowering the rights of other 
involved parties, most importantly the rights of the victim. 
B. Interests of the Victim-Mothers 
The vesting of a mother’s parental rights is difficult to dispute because 
she is both the genetic and gestational mother in a rape-related 
pregnancy.30 As both the victim of the rape and the legal parent of the 
child, the mother’s interests are undisputedly strong in both the treatment 
of rape-related pregnancies and the assignment of rights to the biological 
father, and as such, should be given primary consideration. Shared legal 
custody, for example, requires the father to be able to see the child but 
also permits him to share in the decisionmaking, often requiring the 
parents to continue communicating and interacting. For a mother 
attempting to recover from the trauma of rape, this continued contact 
with her abuser can be detrimental to her physical and mental health. 
In addition to a mother’s interests on behalf of her child, the woman 
also has a separate interest in her own physical and mental health arising 
from victimization. Rape can cause bodily trauma, sexually transmitted 
diseases, and other physical injuries inflicted during the assault.31 
Numerous psychological effects can also develop, including anxiety, 
depression, suicidal tendencies, and phobias.32 Pregnancy can increase 
both the mental and physical trauma experienced by the victim when she 
undergoes further physical and psychological changes during her 
pregnancy. 
The stress of having to make a decision concerning the continuation 
of the pregnancy, often within a short time span, can magnify the 
pressures and symptoms of the mother’s condition, and this stress can be 
intensified by the unpredictability of her legal situation. Should the 
woman decide to carry the pregnancy to term, the possibility of sharing 
parental rights with her attacker may further enhance or prolong the 
psychological effects of her situation.33 Stronger standards with greater 
 
 30. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 7610(a) (West 2012) (“The parent and child relationship may be 
established as follows: (a) Between a child and the natural mother, it may be established by proof of 
her having given birth to the child.”). 
 31. Holmes et al., supra note 20, at 320. 
 32. Shauna R. Prewitt, Giving Birth to a “Rapist’s Child”: A Discussion and Analysis of the 
Limited Legal Protections Afforded to Women Who Become Mothers Through Rape, 98 Geo. L.J. 827, 
832–33 (2010); see Holmes et al., supra note 20, at 320 (listing rape as a significant factor for post-
traumatic stress disorder); Richard O. de Visser et al., The Impact of Sexual Coercion on 
Psychological, Physical, and Sexual Well-being in a Representative Sample of Australian Women, 
36 Archives of Sexual Behav. 676, 677 (2007) (listing other effects of rape, including post-traumatic 
stress disorder, depression, poor physical health, and coping with alcohol and drugs). The effects of 
rape will vary from victim to victim, but the range of physical and psychological effects is quite broad 
and a very serious concern. 
 33. Prewitt, supra note 32, at 832–33. 
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predictability in what rights a biological father may receive, as well as a 
more guided decisionmaking scheme for the courts, may help reduce the 
victim’s anxiety and other psychological traumas by decreasing some of the 
unknowns of her future.34 A mother may be able to more clearly consider 
her options absent uncertainty of what rights the rapist may retain. 
In addition to treating her rape-related health conditions, the mother 
may also need to protect herself from continued physical and psychological 
abuse by her rapist. Particularly with intimate partner rapes, a victim may 
refrain from reporting her abuser to law enforcement out of fear of 
retaliation.35 Thus, women in intimate relationships with their abusers are 
likely to suffer further violence and physical injuries, as well as feelings 
of vulnerability, loss of control in the relationship, and overall poor 
mental health.36 These feelings not only prevent the victim from healing 
from her trauma, but may later also adversely affect the child. Tools 
available in civil or family courts—such as restraining orders and 
restriction of parental rights—are often more approachable than criminal 
prosecutions. 
Rape-related pregnancy discussions often focus on the negative 
risks of a woman’s extended legal connection with a rapist through a 
determination of parenting,37 but there are also potential benefits to 
establishing paternity. A determination of legal paternity attaches 
additional obligations and duties on a father, including the obligation to 
provide financial support. Raising a child is expensive and can be a 
burden on a single mother.38 A court order for child support can reduce 
that burden by ensuring that the single mother is not left as the sole 
provider for her child or children. Recent years have brought a dramatic 
increase in governmental efforts to enforce and collect child support 
 
 34. See Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 500 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Wis. 1993) (denying “perpetrators of sexual 
assault the right to contest termination of their parental rights also comports with public policy. It 
promotes the policy of protecting victims of crime by assuring that victims of sexual assault will not 
have to face their assailants” at extended proceedings). 
 35. Kara N. Bitar, The Parental Rights of Rapists, 19 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 275, 279–80 
(2012) (listing reasons victims do not report abuse to include fear and embarrassment). 
 36. N. N. Sarkar, The Impact of Intimate Partner Violence on Women’s Reproductive Health and 
Pregnancy Outcome, 28 J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 266, 268–69 (2008). 
 37. Prewitt, supra note 32, at 831–36. For example, Prewitt devotes a portion of her discussion to 
the negative consequences of “A Lifetime Tethered to Their Rapist,” highlighting very serious and 
real concerns that should not be ignored in a discussion of the consequences of rape. Id. 
 38. The yearly cost of raising one child in a single family home, with a household income of less than 
$59,410, is estimated at $10,010. Cost of Raising a Child Calculator, U.S. Dep’t of Ag., Ctr. for Nutrition 
Pol’y & Promotion, available at www.cnpp.usda.gov/calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). The yearly 
cost of raising one child in a single family home, with a household income of over $59,410, is estimated to 
be $21,633. Id. Both numbers are based upon a national average and include estimated costs for housing, 
food, transportation, clothing, healthcare, child care, and other expenses. Id. 
Stevens_12 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete) 4/9/2014 4:40 PM 
876 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:865 
payments, increasing the likelihood that a rapist’s obligation of support 
may benefit the victim and child.39 
On the other hand, the establishment of paternity, as well as the 
termination of the biological father’s rights, may also affect the mother’s 
ability to qualify for welfare benefits.40 A mother in need of additional 
financial support may have no choice but to seek assistance from the 
biological father—if not through court-ordered child support payments, 
then through prerequisites for government-funded welfare. Depending 
on a woman’s particular circumstances, the amount received through 
welfare programs may be inadequate. Additionally, the biological father 
may default on his child support obligations. Even in light of a 
termination of custody or visitation rights, this financial strain may 
effectively ensure continued contact between a woman and her rapist. A 
change in the treatment of child support,41 as well as a potential adjustment 
in the welfare system, would help alleviate both these financial and 
emotional burdens.42 
C. Interests of the Children 
The primary interests of the child at stake in these circumstances are 
physical and emotional health, well-being, and development. In light of a 
child’s age and vulnerability, parents are often granted the decisionmaking 
powers for their children, under the presumption that the parents will act 
in the best interest of the children.43 However, the parents (one or both) 
 
 39. The Child Support program was first established in 1975. Office of Child Support 
Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t. Of Health & Human Servs., OCSE Fact Sheet, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/css/resource/ocse-fact-sheet (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
The recent change in the treatment of child support obligations began in 1988, with the passage 
of the Family Support Act. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (1988) (requiring each state to develop mandatory 
presumptions for child support as well as methods for paternity establishment). In 1994, the Full Faith 
and Credit for Child Support Orders Act was passed to require states to enforce child support orders 
from another state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994). In 1996, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(“TANF”) was passed as a part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act, establishing block grants to states as well as strengthening the legislative force behind the 
determination of parties responsible to child support and the collection of that support. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 601 (1996). TANF tied child support programs in with welfare reform to ensure that children receive 
more support from their parents as opposed to the state. Office of Child Support Enforcement, supra. 
 40. Ira Mark Ellman, Thinking About Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 
36 Fam. L.Q. 49, 70 (2002) (“Mothers receiving welfare benefits may be denied this choice [of living 
free of the father’s presence] by the relevant public agency, which will require their cooperation in 
locating the father unless persuaded the mother has ‘good cause’ to refuse.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 215 (Wyo. 1995) (enforcing the support obligations 
of a non-custodial parent to best promote the welfare of the child). 
 42. See infra Conclusion. 
 43. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000). See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) 
(concerning the fundamental interest that an unwed father has in his biological children, because he is 
acting in the best interest of the children, but the same fundamental right applies to the biological 
mothers as well). This right has been recently reaffirmed by Troxel, granting deference to parental 
determinations concerning their children in the absence of parental unfitness. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. 
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are often not fit to make decisions for their child, and in extreme 
situations, a court will initiate the process in which the State intervenes 
to protect the child’s welfare.  
States and courts often make these intervention determinations—
often custody, visitation, and other care decisions—using a “best interest 
of the child” standard, which is prevalent throughout family law.44 This 
best interest standard takes into consideration many factors, including 
the mental and physical health (such as threats of abuse to the child or a 
parent), continuity and stability of care, developmental needs, and 
financial support and stability.45 With both the parents and the State 
playing a role in protecting the interests of the child, it is rare that the 
child’s interests are taken into consideration independently from those of 
another party or the State; children’s interests are often championed by a 
parent or a guardian ad litem, but rarely by the child herself.46 Despite 
this joined representation of interests, the interests of the child are still 
important to consider within the framework of the assignment and 
termination of parental rights. 
A primary issue is which parent, if either, will be permitted to retain 
visitation rights to and/or custody over the child. Which parent retains 
access and custody impacts many primary caretaking decisions concerning 
the child, such as where the child lives and attends school. The 
circumstances of conception (such as being born into a loving versus an 
abusive home situation, two-parent homes, or contentious rape-related 
pregnancies) can largely influence the stability of the home and 
development of the child. Studies have shown that a child’s development 
flourishes in a home with warmth and affection, which leads to higher 
social competence and lower levels of behavioral problems.47 Furthermore, 
exposure to domestic violence, which can include sexual assault, between 
married, dating, or formerly dating or married couples, has been shown to 
cause adverse behavioral and psychological effects in children.48 The 
 
 44. See N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-06.2 (2013) (“For the purpose of parental rights and 
responsibilities, the best interests and welfare of the child is determined by the court’s consideration 
and evaluation of all factors affecting the best interests and welfare of the child.”); see also Finlay v. 
Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (setting a standard for courts to act “as parens patriae to do what 
is best for the interest of the child”). Many other states and cases have verified this as the appropriate 
standard of review for instances concerning children. 
 45. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-212 (2013) (listing relevant parenting factors to determine 
the “[b]est interest of child”); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307 (West 2013) (listing factors to consider 
for the child’s best interest). 
 46. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972) (rejecting the dissent’s suggestion that more 
weight be given to the interests of the children). 
 47. See generally Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents: Psychology, Law, 
and Policy, 64 Am. Psychol. 727 (2009) (discussing the needs of children and how they are equally met 
in gay or lesbian families). 
 48. See generally Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence: The 
Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 Hastings L.J. 1 (2001). 
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interactions between parents, as well as the likelihood that these conflicts 
will be resolved, can strongly influence the child and must be considered 
when making parental rights determinations using the best interest of the 
child standard.49 It is also likely that the interests of the child will factor in 
to the decisions the woman makes concerning her pregnancy. 
IV.  Options Available to the Pregnant Victim After Rape 
The freedom of reproductive choice has long been debated publicly, 
with current doctrine protecting the right of most women to make any 
decision she chooses—within certain legal limitations. The Supreme 
Court has upheld the right to reproductive freedom as a privacy right 
inherent in due process protections: “If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”50 
Reproductive rights are not restricted to pregnancies resulting from rape 
or sexual assault, but apply to the decision of any pregnant woman.51 These 
rights empower women to choose between three options: abortion, 
adoption, or keeping the child. 
A. Abortion 
The most common choice among women with a rape-related 
pregnancy is abortion; fifty percent of women choose to abort their rape-
related pregnancy.52 Since Roe v. Wade, a woman’s right to abortion has 
been both judicially and legislatively recognized and affirmed as a 
fundamental personal privacy right that is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but this right remains actively contested and frequently 
challenged.53 Planned Parenthood v. Casey explicitly articulated the right 
of a married woman to terminate a pregnancy without needing to notify 
 
 49. See McCarty v. McCarty, 807 A.2d 1211, 1215–17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (considering the 
relationship between the parents in determining custody of a child); see also In re C.S., No. 11-0233, 
2011 WL 8199178 at *2 (W.Va. Sept. 26, 2011) (“The record below shows that the child at issue is 
totally unaware of petitioner and the circumstances of her conception. . . . As such, the circuit court 
found that ‘it would be a travesty of justice to force an association between this child and the 
[petitioner], when this child has no knowledge that she is the product of sexual assault.’ Based upon 
this finding, it is clear that the circuit court made its decision based upon the child’s best interests.”). 
 50. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 51. Id. at 440 (addressing the provision of contraceptives to unmarried women in order to prevent 
pregnancies rather than the termination of an unwanted pregnancy). 
 52. Holmes et al., supra note 20, at 322 (reporting results from a study conducted over a three-
year period from 1990 until 1992). 
 53. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). The Supreme Court reaffirmed constitutional 
protection of the right to terminate a pregnancy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Casey. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992). 
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or obtain the consent of her husband.54 Abortions are still subject to 
certain limitations absent a medical necessity to protect the health of the 
mother, such as the prohibition on abortion after the viability55 of the 
fetus, mandatory waiting and counseling requirements, and parental 
consent requirements.56 
In the face of varying statutory schemes concerning the parental 
rights assigned to biological fathers, even in the instance of rape, “the only 
sure way a victim can avoid the possibility of a rapist having parental rights 
is to have an abortion.”57 However, this option is not always available to 
all victims because of delays in awareness of the pregnancy, medical 
risks, and personal moral opposition.58 Of women included in a 1995 
survey on pregnancy, more than thirty-two percent did not discover they 
were pregnant until the second trimester (twelve to twenty-six weeks 
after the rape).59 Such delays vastly reduce the availability of abortion. 
Outside of medical delays, culture, religion, and location can also be 
barriers to pursuing abortion.60 The Supreme Court assured, however, that 
should a woman opt for an abortion, she may do so without requiring the 
consent of the biological father, making this decision entirely her own.61  
This Note proposes expanded legal protections because abortion as 
the only option through which a victim can ensure her rapist not retain 
any parental rights is quite limiting, to say the least. 
B. Adoption 
A second option is to put the child up for adoption. Choosing 
adoption requires the woman carry the child to term, then voluntarily 
relinquish her rights to the child. Adoption is the least common selection 
 
 54. Casey, 505 U.S. at 898 (“The husband’s interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying does 
not permit the State to empower him with this troubling degree of authority over his wife.”). 
 55. In the context of pregnancy, viability refers to the point in time at which a fetus could be 
“capable of living . . . [or] having attained such form and development as to be normally capable of 
surviving outside the mother’s womb.” See Viable, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/viable (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
 56. The limitations on abortion are typically time restrictions, as abortions may constitutionally 
be restricted after fetal liability, as well as requirements to make a fully informed choice. Id. at 872. 
The restriction on abortions after viability can, in fact, restrict women with a rape-related pregnancy, 
should the mother not realize that she is pregnant until past the point of viability or know she is 
pregnant but wait for paternity testing on the fetus prior to making her decision. Bitar, supra note 35, 
at 283. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-202 (2013) (requiring a two-day waiting period after 
consulting a physician), with La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1299.35.7 (2013) (waiving the twenty-four hour 
waiting period for pregnant victims of rape and incest). 
 57. Bitar, supra note 35, at 286. 
 58. Id. at 282–83. 
 59. Holmes et al., supra note 20, at 322. 
 60. See, e.g., S. 1, 83d Cong. (2d Sess. Texas 2013) (banning abortions after twenty weeks and 
closing all but five abortion clinics, thereby limiting access to abortions). 
 61. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (holding that a state 
cannot constitutionally require the consent of the father of the fetus). 
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for women with rape-related pregnancies, accounting for six percent of 
decisions in 1992.62 Most adoption procedures require efforts to locate or 
notify the biological father to obtain his consent. Alternatively, they 
require a hearing for the involuntary termination of the biological father’s 
rights.63 Complications may arise in meeting these requirements, such as 
difficulty in locating the biological father or adversarial confrontation in 
attempts to obtain his consent.64 
However, twenty-six states have enacted legislation protecting rape 
victims who decide to give their child up for adoption. Some such 
protections have eliminated notification or father consent requirements if 
the child was conceived through rape.65 Within these states, there is a split 
between states that require a criminal conviction of the rapist prior to 
termination of his rights and states that require only a showing that the 
pregnancy was a result of rape or sexual assault.66 For situations in which 
the father has been convicted of rape, there is a lower burden of proof at 
the adoption stage because the rape has already been proven in criminal 
court.67 For states that do not require a conviction, a hearing is necessary 
to prove that the child was conceived by rape or sexual assault, typically 
under the clear and convincing standard of proof.68 
For the notification exception to apply, however, the victim must 
first initiate, and then endure, the criminal prosecution of her abuser 
prior to giving her child up for adoption. States that do not require a 
conviction, hold fact-finding hearings to establish that the pregnancy 
resulted from rape.69 Both methods take additional time, preventing the 
mother from relinquishing her rights shortly after the birth of her child 
 
 62. Holmes et al., supra note 20, at 322. 
 63. Ira Mark Ellman et al., Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 1331–32 (5th ed. 2010). 
 64. Bitar, supra note 35, at 285–86. 
 65. Id. at 287 n.99–101 (listing the different state statutes concerning rape-related pregnancies). 
Since the publication of Bitar’s article, Oregon has revised its statute; it is now codified under section 
419B.510 of the Oregon Revised Code.  
 66. See Bitar, supra note 35, at 287–90. For example, Washington state permits “[a]n alleged 
father’s, birth parent’s, or parent’s consent to adoption [to] be dispensed with if the court finds that . . . 
the alleged father, birth parent, or parent has been found guilty of rape.” Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 26.33.170(2) (2013). Alternatively, Wisconsin is one state that does not require a conviction of rape 
or sexual assault, permitting the termination of parental rights upon evidence at a fact-finding hearing 
“indicating that the person who may be the father of the child committed, during a possible time of 
conception, a sexual assault . . . against the mother of the child.” Wis. Stat. § 48.415(9) (2013). 
One primary difference between these two options is also the applicable burden of proof that is 
necessary. For a criminal trial, the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the civil 
termination of parental rights requires the lesser standard of clear and convincing evidence 
(sometimes just a preponderance of evidence), making the civil showing an easier burden for victims 
to satisfy. 
 67. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125C.210(2) (West 2013) (creating a rebuttable presumption 
against custody to a convicted father). 
 68. Bitar, supra note 35, at 291; see Fla. Stat. § 39.806(1)(m) (2013) (“The court determines by 
clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived as a result of an act of sexual battery.”). 
 69. See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(9). 
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and securing a relatively quick placement. The goal of adoption is to 
promote the welfare, protection, and best interests of a child, effectuated 
by providing the child with a stable home that nurtures development.70 
Any delays in the adoption process prolong the time it takes to 
permanently place the child, preventing the child’s readjustment to a new 
environment and extending the involvement of the mother. 
The most frequent form of adoption is second-parent adoption, a 
process through which the spouse of a legal parent adopts the child.71 For 
a woman assaulted by a stranger or a former intimate partner, second-
parent adoption often requires the consent of the other biological parent 
because it falls within the same legal requirements as regular adoptions.72 
A woman in a relationship with a partner who was not her rapist may want 
her current partner to adopt the child. Without an efficient procedure for 
the termination of the parental rights of the rapist, the adoption may be 
delayed or prevented entirely, again prolonging the permanency that is in 
the best interest of the child and mother.  
C. Keeping the Child 
More than thirty-two percent of the time, a mother decides to raise 
the child herself.73 Keeping a child conceived by marital rape raises some 
additional concerns for the mother. Many states presume paternity of the 
husband, automatically vesting parental rights into the man married to 
the woman who gave birth without requiring further proof. Should a 
woman seek to terminate the parental rights of her husband, filing for 
divorce may be a mandatory step, adding further obstacles to a final 
determination of the father’s parental rights.74 
Only sixteen states currently have legislation that specifically 
provides any means by which the mother can terminate the parental 
rights of her rapist.75 These states vary in their treatment of these rights in 
 
 70. Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 568 (Cal. 2003). 
 71. Child Welfare Info. Gateway, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Stepparent 
Adoption at 1 (May 2013), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/f_step.cfm; see Ellman et 
al., supra note 63, at 1314. 
 72. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-203(f) (2013) (requiring “[w]ritten and verified consent of 
the parent or parents . . . in a stepparent adoption where the child is conceived and born out of 
wedlock.”); see also In re the Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“As 
with other adoptions, a trial court considering a petition for a second-parent adoption must comply 
with the dictates of [the statute] in finding, inter alia, that ‘the adoption requested is in the best interest 
of the child.’”). 
 73. Holmes et al., supra note 20, at 320. 
 74. For example, Nevada creates a rebuttable presumption upon divorce against granting custody 
with the father if the father has been convicted of sexual assault. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125C.210(2) (West 
2013). 
 75. Prewitt, supra note 32, at 853–54. One example is California Family Code section 3030(b), 
which mandates that “[n]o person shall be granted custody of, or visitation with, a child if the person 
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circumstances of alleged or proven rape, ranging from full termination of 
the father’s rights to a denial of custody or visitation privileges.76 Similar 
to adoption statutes, many states first require a conviction for rape prior 
to the termination of any rights, thereby limiting the instances in which 
these protections are exercised.77 
A broad spectrum of options might be available to a pregnant rape 
victim: abortion, adoption, or keeping the child. Each of these choices is 
significantly different, and choosing is not easy. It is important to draft 
legislative protections for rape victims that cover all of these choices so 
that women are not restricted in legal options. Further, statutory 
acknowledgement of all of a woman’s reproductive rights would send a 
strong policy message against rewarding rapists with continued access to 
their victims. 
V.  The Judicial Treatment of Paternal Rights: From Presumption 
to Biology-Plus 
Different rights are assigned to a biological father depending on the 
mother’s reproductive choice. As previously discussed, a biological father 
has no right to prevent a woman from choosing abortion.78 However, the 
biological father may have a right to prevent the mother from giving the 
child up for adoption. The rights assigned to the father can depend on 
external factors, the most influential of these being marriage. The 
development of rights has induced the “biology-plus” common law 
standard that is often used to review parental rights cases, including rape-
related pregnancies. The development of such rights also exemplifies 
how common law at the Supreme Court level has the ability to shape 
family law doctrine, albeit slowly. 
Over the past fifty years, the treatment of unwed fathers has 
undergone a dramatic shift. Traditionally, common law only recognized 
the relationship between a man and a child born to his wife, granting no 
legal recognition to a non-marital child.79 This treatment—and 
accompanying social attitudes—created a stigma against “illegitimate” 
children, precluding most paternal obligations outside of a marital home.80 
 
has been convicted [of rape] and the child was conceived as a result of that violation.” Cal. Fam. Code 
§ 3030(b) (West 2013). 
 76. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 3030(b). Custody rights entail decisionmaking authority over the 
child, so the termination of custody rights over a child—both legal and physical—works to limit the 
control a biological father may have over the child; see also supra note 26. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See supra Part V (discussing the option of abortion). 
 79. Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-neutrality and 
the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 67 (1995). 
 80. The differential treatment of illegitimate children was widespread in different areas of law, 
including family law and estate (inheritance) laws. See, e.g., 14 Witkin, Summary 10th Out of Wedlock 
Children, § 90 (2005); 41 Am. Jur. 2d Illegitimate Children § 144 (2014). 
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Additionally, it was presumed that a man not married to the mother had 
no interest in parenting or otherwise supporting that child. 
The Supreme Court initiated a change in the judicial and legislative 
treatment of unmarried families in 1972.81 In Stanley v. Illinois, a father 
intermittently lived with and helped raise his three children, all born out 
of wedlock to the same woman, for eighteen years.82 Following the death 
of the mother, the children were declared wards of the state and Stanley 
was denied a custody hearing, prompting him to challenge the state’s 
actions.83 The Court found that “[t]he private interest here, that of a man 
in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, 
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”84 This decision 
redefined the rights of a father by recognizing a fundamental constitutional 
interest in parenting rooted in the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.85 
Subsequent rulings distinguished Stanley by clarifying that a father 
must establish a relationship beyond mere biology to receive parental 
protections. In 1978, the Supreme Court recognized the “biology-plus” 
standard in Quilloin v. Walcott.86 In Quilloin, the Court refused to extend 
these fundamental protections to a father who did not undertake any 
significant responsibilities in caring for the child and had done no more 
than acknowledge that the child was biologically his.87 In light of those 
circumstances, the Court held that the foundation for a father’s liberty 
interest was lacking.88 The following year, the Court reaffirmed the 
liberty interest of a father who had formed a relationship with his child, 
emphasizing the importance of active efforts to be a parent.89 
The Court further delineated the contours of the biology-plus 
standard in Lehr v. Robertson in 1983.90 The Court again held that a mere 
biological relationship with a child does not in itself create a 
constitutionally protected relationship, but noted that it does create a 
unique opportunity for a biological father to establish such a relationship.91 
 
 81. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 82. Id. at 646. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 651. 
 85. Id. at 658; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 86. 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). 
 87. Id. at 255–56. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979) (reaffirming that the father should be treated 
like the mother in terms of requiring due process prior to the termination of his parental rights when it 
can be shown that he demonstrated significant parental interest in the child). 
 90. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 91. Id. at 261–62. 
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To properly determine a father’s interest in his relationship with his child, 
courts must assess the quality of the relationship between the father and 
his child to determine whether he has met the biology-plus standard.92 
In 1989, however, the biology-plus standard lost some footing in 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.93 Marital presumptions appear in many state 
statutes because they were adopted from the Uniform Parentage Act 
(“UPA”).94 The UPA applies a traditional marital presumption, rebuttable 
only by voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or a judicial ruling.95 In 
Michael H., the Court upheld California’s presumption that a woman’s 
husband is the legal father of a child born during their marriage, even in 
a situation where the biological father attempted to establish a 
meaningful relationship with his daughter.96 The application of a marital 
presumption depends on the jurisdiction, but Michael H. reaffirmed the 
validity of such presumptions, limiting the influence of a biology-plus 
relationship in certain contexts. Despite these presumptions, the biology-
plus standard is still the applicable judicial doctrine for determining the 
parental rights of fathers and could be employed to restrict the rights of 
rapist fathers.  
VI.  The Pros and Cons of the Current Legislative Regime 
Any statutory scheme that is developed concerning rape-related 
pregnancies must consider the interests of fathers, mothers, children, and 
the State.97 In part because of the variety of interests at play, as well as 
other influential factors, there is no consistent statutory scheme 
controlling the parental rights for rape-related pregnancies; statutes 
 
 92. Id. at 266–67 (“[T]he existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent 
and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the 
child.”). The Court recently reaffirmed these principles in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 
2552 (2013). Adoptive Couple requires additional consideration of the Indian Child Welfare Act, but 
the opinion still recognized as a factor that “Biological Father ‘made no meaningful attempts to 
assume his responsibility of parenthood.’” Id. at 2558. 
 93. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 94. Unif. Parentage Act § 204 (2000) (amended 2002) (“A man is presumed to be the father of a 
child if: (1) he and the mother are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage.”). 
 95.  See id.; see also Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the Paternity of 
Marital Children, 37 Fam. L.Q. 55, 65 (2003); Unif. Law Comm’n, Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on 
Unif. State Laws, Parentage Act Summary, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary. 
aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). The 2002 amended version of the UPA has 
been adopted by nine states, while nineteen states adopted the original 1973 version of the UPA. See 
Acts: Parentage Act, Unif. Law Comm’n, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); Uniform Matrimonial and Family Laws 
Locator, Legal Info. Inst., Cornell U. L. Sch., http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol9 (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2014). For a summary of Uniform Parentage Act, see Parentage Act Summary, Unif. Law 
Comm’n, www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Parentage+Act (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
 96. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 111. For another description of the relevant cases, see generally 
Shanley, supra note 79. 
 97. See supra Part III (discussing the various policy interests relating to rape-related pregnancies). 
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range from no special considerations at all to permitting full termination 
of parental rights upon a civil finding of sexual assault.98 
A. States that Explicitly Limit Protections to “Out-of-Wedlock” 
Children 
All fifty states have criminalized marital rape, but this advancement is 
not always reflected in the parental rights at issue in this Note. Of the 
thirty-one states providing some form of legislative protection for rape-
related pregnancies, five—Indiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, and 
Wyoming—expressly limit their provisions to “out-of-wedlock” children.99 
Having language limiting the law’s application to out-of-wedlock 
children conceived by rape precludes any claims by victims of marital 
rape. The selective wording may reflect the reality that adoptions in the 
instance of marital rape will be more difficult. The husband will likely be 
aware of both the pregnancy and the birth; therefore, a husband will be 
more readily available to withhold his consent should he so choose. With 
the “out-of-wedlock” language, these statutes may operate against the 
mother should she leave her abusive husband and attempt to limit the 
rights of the father.100 
However, there is a mechanism to keep this out-of-wedlock 
language and still provide some protection to a woman who was raped by 
her husband. Nevada has created a presumption against granting custody 
to a convicted abuser.101 Notwithstanding the conviction requirement, 
Nevada’s presumption is an effective protection for dealing with marital 
rape, granting the survivor of domestic violence some certainty of 
custody of her child upon divorce. Although there is no perfect solution 
when dealing with marital rape, presumptions against paternal custody 
 
 98. See generally Bitar, supra note 35 (discussing in full the variations in state statutory treatment 
of rape-related pregnancies). 
 99. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(4)(a) (2013) (establishing that consent to adoption not required 
from a father of a child born out of wedlock conceived by rape for which the father is convicted); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 43-104.15 (2013) (permitting adoptions of out-of-wedlock children born of sexual assault 
without required notification); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125C.210(2) (West 2013) (limiting effect of 
spousal rape to creation of a rebuttable presumption against custody to a convicted abuser upon 
divorce); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111-a(1) (McKinney 2013) (not requiring notice for adoption 
proceedings of out-of-wedlock children conceived as a result of rape); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-
110(a)(viii) (2013) (requiring that adoption may be ordered without consent if the child was born out 
of wedlock as a result of sexual assault or incest for which the father is convicted). 
 100. This would apply in two separate situations: (1) a divorce followed by the mother attempting 
to free her child for adoption to third parties, which would require the consent of the father, and (2) 
second-parent adoption (when a parent wants her spouse to legally adopt the child), which is much 
more frequent and accounts for about half of adoptions. 
 101. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 215C.210(2). Other states have similar presumptions against custody 
or visitation to a perpetrator of domestic violence (without the out-of-wedlock wording). See, e.g., 
Cal. Fam. Code § 3044 (West 2013) (“[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or 
joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is 
detrimental to the best interest of the child.”). 
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upon divorce for convicted abusers are a step in the right direction to 
protect the interests of the victim and her child. 
B. States that Require Criminal Conviction 
Many states provide for the termination of the father’s parental 
rights following a conviction for rape. Oregon, for example, terminates 
parental rights if the court finds that the child was conceived by an act 
resulting in a conviction for rape.102 Other states leave the discretion with 
the judge, permitting but not requiring a judge to terminate parental 
rights following a rape conviction.103 
Requiring a conviction is a significant burden and can establish a 
barrier for a victim eliminating her rapist’s parental rights. Reporting 
rates for rape are low; the Department of Justice approximates that from 
1992 to 2000, sixty-three percent (83,700) of the 131,950 rapes per year 
went unreported to the police.104 In a single year (2011), the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) estimates the total number of rapes was 
83,425.105 Other sources provide lower numbers, with estimates of 
unreported rapes closer to sixty percent.106 The majority of rapes go 
unreported and are therefore not prosecuted. 
Of one hundred rapes, about forty will be reported to police, with ten 
leading to an arrest, eight ending in prosecution, and only four resulting in 
a felony conviction.107 The FBI determined that the arrest rate for rape in 
2010 was only twenty-four percent and the conviction rate even lower.108 
These rates decrease even more when contrasted with the total number of 
estimated rapes, rather than just reported rapes; an estimated 7.8% of 
 
 102. Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.510 (2013). The definition of rape in Oregon includes sexual 
intercourse by forcible compulsion with a victim under various ages (twelve, fourteen, and sixteen, 
depending on the circumstances), or who is incapable of consent. Id. §§ 163.365, 163.375. For a 
complete list of the states requiring convictions, see Bitar, supra note 35, at 292 n.132. 
 103. This discretion is indicated by the use of “may” rather than “must” or “shall,” making the 
termination of rights not a guaranteed protection. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 39.806(1)(m) (2013) 
(“Grounds for termination of parental rights may be established under any of the following 
circumstances: . . . the child was conceived as a result of an act of sexual battery.” (emphasis added)). 
 104. Callie Marie Rennison, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Rape and 
Sexual Assault: Reporting to Police and Medical Attention, 1992–2000 at 2 tbl.3 (2002). A 2012 
survey of victimization reported to police found that only twenty-eight percent of rape or sexual 
assault victims filed police reports. See Jennifer Truman et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National 
Crime Victimization Survey: Criminal Victimization, 2012 at 4 (2013). Rape and sexual assault are 
still the lowest reported crimes compared to other types of violent victimization. Id. at 6 fig. 3. 
 105. Criminal Justice Info. Servs., supra note 7 (excluding consensual statutory rape). 
 106. Rape, Abuse & Incest Nat’l Network, Reporting Rates, http://www.rainn.org/get-
information/statistics/reporting-rates (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Sarah Tofte, A Needed Revolution: Testing Rape Kits and U.S. Justice, in The Unfinished 
Revolution: Voices From the Global Fight for Women’s Rights 199, 203–04 (Minky Worden ed., 
2012). 
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rapes are prosecuted, with only 3.3% resulting in a conviction.109 Thus, the 
conviction requirement for the termination of parental rights of rapists 
only provides protections to a small subset of victims.110 The law should 
provide protections to victims regardless of whether they officially report 
the sexual assault. Further, the law should provide protections for women 
who can prove that a rape occurred under the civil law clear and 
convincing standard, but are unable to obtain a conviction under the 
higher beyond a reasonable doubt criminal standard. 
When looking only at the estimated incidents of intimate partner 
rape, the percentage of unreported rapes increases to seventy-seven 
percent.111 Intimate rapes are less likely to be prosecuted and even less 
likely to result in a conviction.112 Rape victims often decide not to report 
or request prosecution because of their relationships with the rapist.113 
Reasons provided for not reporting the abuse include not wanting to see a 
loved one punished, emotional bonds, financial dependency on her abuser, 
fear of future physical or psychological retaliation, and insensitivity in the 
criminal justice system.114 Should a woman report the crime in the hopes 
of pursuing prosecution, other barriers to convictions still exist, including 
shorter reporting periods, reduced or non-mandatory sentences, and 
social stigma—which may influence the jury.115 Notwithstanding the other 
hurdles in terminating a husband’s parental rights, requiring a conviction 
makes it even more improbable that a victim will receive legal 
protections.116 
C. States that Only Provide Protections for Adoption 
Given the low number of women who opt to give their child up for 
adoption,117 adoption-specific protections should not be the sole remedy 
 
 109. Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 17, at 33. 
 110. It is important to note that the above statistics represent all rapes, not just rapes resulting in 
pregnancies. 
 111. Rennison, supra note 104, at 3 (including rapes committed by current or former husbands and 
boyfriends). 
 112. Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 17, at 35. 
 113. Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence a Crime?: Intimate Partner Rape as Allegory, 24 St. 
John’s J. Legal Comment, 535, 557 (2010) (citing Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, 
Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings From the National Violence 
Against Women Survey 49 (2000)) (“The National Violence Against Women Survey found that less 
than one-fifth (17.2%) of those women raped by an intimate partner said they reported the most 
recent rape to police.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992); see also Sack, 
supra note 113, at 557. 
 115. Klarfeld, supra note 15, at 1833–36. 
 116. Sack, supra note 113, at 557 (“[P]rosecution remains infrequent and conviction rates are low. 
Ultimately, only about 7.5% of all intimate partner rapes are prosecuted and, of those, 58.1% do not 
result in a conviction.”). 
 117. See Holmes et al., supra note 20, at 322; see also Anjani Chandra & Penelope Maza, Adoption, 
Adoption Seeking, and Relinquishment for Adoption in the United States, 306 Advance Data, May 11, 
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available to rape victims. These adoption rates show how laws should not 
be limited to adoption consent and notification because they reflect the 
low number of women receiving protections. These statutes effectively 
ignore the plight of women who choose to raise the child as their own by 
exposing them to further complications such as custody and visitation 
scheduling or child support hearings and payment enforcement. 
However, just because adoption is not frequently chosen does not 
make the protections through which consent and notification requirements 
for adoption can be removed any less important to include in the statutory 
schemes. Recognizing the need for statutory protections is an important 
step, and adoption protections should be included as one part of a larger 
statutory scheme to protect all the options available to a pregnant rape 
victim. 
D. States Without Any Statutory Protections 
Many states do not have any legislation in place concerning rape-
related pregnancies.118 Some of these states have adopted indirect 
methods by which a mother could seek to terminate the parental rights of 
her rapist that are built into the more general termination statutes.119 
Many statutes include “conviction of and imprisonment for a felony” as 
one consideration in parental rights terminations.120 Convictions for rape 
are difficult to obtain, but even with a conviction, this factor is just one of 
many to be balanced in the overall ruling.121 
Another indirect protection applies only to stranger rapists because 
failure to locate an unknown father is another factor considered by some 
states.122 Requiring a victim to locate her attacker is emotionally 
distressing, especially if she reported the crime and the police have already 
attempted and failed to locate the rapist. Again, this consideration of failed 
attempts to locate the biological father is not determinative on its own and 
is only an indirect protection. 
 
1999, at 9 (reporting that from 1989 to 1995, about one percent of children born to all unmarried 
women were voluntarily relinquished for adoption); Child Welfare Info. Gateway, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Voluntary Relinquishment for Adoption, at 2 (Mar. 2005) (reporting that 
even fewer married or formerly married women will voluntarily relinquish a child for adoption). 
 118. Bitar, supra note 35, at 286–87 (stating that only “[t]hirty-one states have enacted some form 
of legislation to address the problem of rapists having parental rights”). 
 119. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-533(B)(4) (2013) (permitting the termination of parental 
rights upon a conviction of a felony, including a rape conviction). 
 120. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-15-319(a)(4) (2013); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-533(B)(4) 
(including conviction of and incarceration for a felony as an indication of parental unfitness). 
 121. See supra Part III.A. 
 122. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-3-604(1)(a)(II) (2013) (“That the identity of the parent of the 
child is unknown and has been unknown for three months or more and that reasonable efforts to 
identify and locate the parent . . . have failed.”). 
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There are two standards often applied in family law that may 
preclude some rapists from obtaining or enforcing parental rights in the 
absence of specific state laws. First, the biology-plus standard would 
disfavor any rapist who is unable to prove he is an interested father;123 in 
particular, this standard would exclude stranger rapists from exercising 
parental rights. Second, is the best interest of the child standard.124 If a 
court finds that granting custody, visitation, or other rights to a rapist is 
not in the best interest of the child (when considering the whole of a 
child’s welfare), the father may lose his parental rights. These standards 
can indirectly prevent a rapist who is also an unfit father from keeping 
his parental rights if challenged by the mother. 
E. States with Positive Statutory Components 
Very few statutes mandate the termination of parental rights in light 
of a criminal rape conviction.125 Nevada’s statute provides that a person 
convicted of sexual assault “has no right to custody of or visitation with the 
child unless the natural mother or legal guardian consents.”126 Nevada finds 
a criminal conviction for rape to be clear and convincing evidence of a 
valid reason to terminate parental rights should the mother or guardian 
challenge the father’s rights.127 This requirement makes it easier to obtain a 
conclusive determination of the parental rights of the rapist without having 
to endure another civil proceeding, and increases predictability in the 
outcome. 
A recent amendment to the Oregon statute regarding termination of 
parental rights provides another beneficial protection of the mother’s 
interests because, unlike other states, it expressly maintains the obligation 
to pay child support.128 The current statute now provides that a judicial 
 
 123. See supra Part V (discussing the origins and application of the biology-plus standard). 
 124. For example, Delaware (a state without a rape-related pregnancy statute) requires that a 
termination of parental rights must appear “to be in the child’s best interest.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, 
§ 1103(a) (2013). 
 125. The states that do require a termination of rights are Maine and North Carolina. See Me. Rev. 
Stat. § 1658 (2013); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.2(c) (2013); see also Bitar, supra note 35, at 289. 
 126. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125C.210(1) (West 2013); see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4.1 (West 2013) 
(establishing that a person convicted of sexual assault “shall not be awarded the custody of or 
visitation rights to any minor child, including a minor child who was born as a result” of the criminal 
assault); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.2(c) (mandating that “a person convicted under this section [first-
degree rape] has no rights to custody of or right of inheritance from any child born as a result of the 
commission of the rape.”). 
 127. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125C.210(1) (“[I]f a child is conceived as the result of sexual assault and the 
person convicted of the sexual assault is the natural father of the child, the person has no right to 
custody of or visitation with the child unless the natural mother or legal guardian consents thereto and 
it is in the best interest of the child.”). 
 128. Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.510 (2013) (“The rights of the parent may be terminated . . . if the court 
finds that the child or ward was conceived as the result of an act that led to the parent’s conviction for 
rape. . . . [T]his section does not relieve the parent of any obligation to pay child support.”). 
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termination of parental rights “does not relieve the parent of any 
obligation to pay child support.”129 This may permit a woman to be more 
financially capable of raising the child without having to share custody with 
her rapist—making the choice to keep the child possible for more women. 
These variations in statutory constructions are steps in the right direction 
and should be incorporated into statutory schemes across the country. 
F. Application of the Statutes by the Courts 
The previous Subpart highlights some of the key variations in statutes 
that address rape-related pregnancies, which then undergo further 
transformation upon being interpreted by judges. The following examples 
of statutory application illustrate the shortcomings and strengths of some 
of the current laws. 
One version of a statutory scheme permits the termination of both 
adoption rights and legal parental rights. A total of thirteen states have 
provisions permitting the court to terminate the parental rights of a 
rapist, with or without convictions for the sexual assault.130 Granting 
courts the discretion to terminate all parental rights without a criminal 
conviction for rape facilitates family stability by providing a lower 
evidentiary burden for procedures such as stepparent adoption, as 
demonstrated by In re the Adoption of C.A.T.131 In Adoption of C.A.T., a 
mother sought termination of her rapist’s parental rights in order to free 
her children (both fathered by her rapist) from adoption by her 
 
 129. Id. Other states terminate custody and visitation rights expressly, without an additional clause 
clarifying that the obligation of support remains. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 3030(b) (West 2013) (“No 
person shall be granted custody of, or visitation with, a child if the person has been convicted [of rape] 
and the child was conceived as a result of that violation.”); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 137 (2012) 
(terminating visitation rights of a parent who conceived the child through the commission of rape); 
S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4A-20 (2013) (“If it is in the best interest of the child, the court may prohibit, 
revoke, or restrict visitation rights to a child for any person who has caused the child to be conceived 
as a result of rape or incest.”). 
 130. Eight states require a conviction of rape or sexual assault prior to the termination of parental 
rights. See Bitar, supra note 35, at 289. The remaining five states do not require a conviction, but 
rather require clear and convincing evidence that the child was conceived of rape or sexual assault. Id. 
at 290–91. “A parent’s parental rights can be involuntarily terminated only by a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence,” requiring more than a preponderance of evidence but below the criminal 
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. In re A.J.B., No. 14-02-00794, 2003 WL 21403480, at *2 (Tex. 
App. June 19, 2003) (discussing the evidentiary standard required for termination of parental rights in 
cases involving rape-related pregnancies); see also Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2136(h)(1)(F) (2013) (using 
“may” rather than “shall” to indicate judicial discretion but not requiring a conviction). 
 131. 273 P.3d 813 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). Another example of a state not requiring convictions for 
the termination of parental rights concerning adoption of rape-conceived children is Alaska. See 
Alaska Stat. § 25.23.180(c)(3) (2013). A good application of the Alaskan statute is In re Adoption of 
A.F.M., 15 P.3d 258 (Alaska 2001). In Re Adoption of A.F.M. confronts issues of proof as the mother 
did not report her assailant to the police (he was a former boyfriend and she “did not want to get him 
in trouble”). Id. at 263. The Alaska court found that termination was warranted on public policy 
grounds, as the child was conceived through a criminal relationship and thus the father did not deserve 
the same protections as other biological fathers. Id. at 264–67. 
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husband.132 The mother contested the father’s claims of consensual 
activity, insisting that she had verbally expressed that she was not 
interested in having sex with him and that she was unable to consent by 
reason of intoxication on both occasions.133 A witness testified that she 
heard the mother’s protestations during the first incident, providing 
additional evidence that the mother was raped.134 The court explained 
that such instances of sexual assault are sufficient grounds to terminate 
the father’s parental rights, but supported its findings by showing that the 
father had failed to properly assume the duties of a parent, using the best 
interest of the child standard as an additional factor upon which to 
terminate the rapist’s parental rights.135 
Despite the correct outcome, cases such as Adoption of C.A.T. 
illustrate many of the problems surrounding the termination of parental 
rights of alleged rapists. The court or jury is often required to make a 
credibility determination by weighing the conflicting versions of the facts 
in the absence of any supporting evidence beyond the testimony of the 
parties. This can be further complicated when a woman does not report 
the rape to the police, and thereby lacks an official complaint against the 
rapist.136 Like the mother in Adoption of C.A.T., many women do not 
report rape to the police because they do not want to have their rapist face 
criminal charges and instead use the family or civil court to obtain an order 
to remove the abuser from her life.137 This type of internal conflict involves 
competing desires—wanting to report her abuse and a crime, protect 
herself and her child, and protect the perpetrator—and further 
demonstrates how statutes with conviction requirements are unable to 
properly protect rape victims.138 Finally, the court’s unwillingness to base 
its determination solely on a finding of sexual assault, providing alternative 
explanations rooted in the best interest of the child standard, shows how 
specifically incorporating these standards into this determination can help 
guide a court and increase the predictability of the outcome. 
New Mexico’s approach is different; its law permits the termination 
of a rapist’s right to refuse consent to adoption without first requiring a 
 
 132. In re Adoption of C.A.T., 273 P.3d at 815. 
 133. Id. at 816. 
 134. Id. at 820. 
 135. Id. at 820–21. 
 136. See supra note 104 (discussing reporting rates). 
 137. The reasons that women do not file police reports are very personal and fact-driven, but there 
are trends. Some victims “fear reprisal” at the hands of their abuser. Reporting Rape, Rape, Abuse & 
Incest Nat’l Network, http://www.rainn.org/get-information/legal-information/reporting-rape (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2014); Maggie O’Cala, Why Women Don’t Always Report Rape, Yahoo! Voices 
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://voices.yahoo.com/why-women-dont-always-report-rape-6839510.html. 
 138. This is particularly an issue in any form of intimate rape because the emotional connection 
between the victim and her abuser provides disincentives for initiating police involvement. 
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conviction.139 Christian Child Placement Service of the New Mexico 
Christian Children’s Home v. Vestal provides a strong analysis of the 
constitutionality of this type of statute.140 The father in question raised 
substantive due process claims, relying on Lehr v. Robinson as a basis for 
constitutional protection of his parent-child relationship.141 However, the 
court rejected this claim in light of the criminal nature of the conception, 
quoting Judge Richard Posner: “The criminal does not acquire 
constitutional rights by his crime other than the procedural rights that the 
Constitution confers on criminal defendants. Pregnancy is an aggravating 
circumstance of a sexual offense, not a mitigating circumstance.”142 No 
fundamental right to a parent-child relationship is established through a 
criminal act, precluding a successful substantive due process challenge to 
this statute. Nor should a rapist be rewarded for his criminal act by 
acquiring additional rights, such as custody of a child.143 Furthermore, this 
type of statute withstands constitutional scrutiny by being “rationally 
related to the State’s legitimate interest in protecting children and 
preventing their exploitation,” again successfully incorporating the best 
interest of the child standard.144 
These statutes also survive procedural due process and equal 
protection scrutiny.145 Procedural due process is not violated by 
terminating the father’s rights without a hearing on his fitness to parent 
following a judicial finding that the child was conceived by rape.146 
Although Stanley v. Illinois established the requirement for a fitness 
hearing—an evaluation of the person’s ability to be a parent—prior to 
terminating an unwed father’s parental rights,147 this need not apply to a 
rapist father because he may be presumed unfit.148 Similarly, an unwed 
father may be treated differently than a rapist father without offending 
the Equal Protection Clause because the latter “is not similarly situated 
to an unmarried man who has fathered a child by a consenting adult 
woman.”149 In light of the constitutional permission for statutes of this 
nature, though falling short of official Supreme Court approval, specific 
and separate treatment of the parental rights of rapists should be 
implemented in all states, under either a controlling standard or rule. 
 
 139. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-5-19(C) (2001) (“[C]onsent to adoption . . . shall not be required: 
(C) a biological father of an adoptee conceived as a result of rape or incest.”). 
 140. 962 P.2d 1261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). 
 141. Id. at 1265. 
 142. Id. (quoting Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 143. Vestal, 962 P.2d at 1265–66. 
 144. Id. at 1266. 
 145. Id. at 1266–67. 
 146. Id. at 1266. 
 147. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). 
 148. See generally Shanley, supra note 79. 
 149. Vestal, 962 P.2d at 1267. 
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VII.  Proposal: Increasing the Legislative Protections for Rape 
Victims 
Like the court in Liberta, one method for altering the treatment of a 
crime is changing precedent through case law. Cases concerning the 
termination of parental rights typically fall within the jurisdiction of the 
state courts; it is rare for cases to be heard before the Supreme Court.150 
In light of the limited federal jurisdiction over family law cases, pursuing a 
doctrinal shift through the courts would be inefficient (given that each 
state has its own judicial system), and would fall short of establishing a 
more nationally consistent legislative scheme for rape-related pregnancies. 
Because of these limitations, a more feasible solution is to change the laws 
themselves. Given that state legislatures can more quickly change laws and 
balance the various policy interests involved, this Note proposes the 
adoption of statutory measures to protect rape victims and their children.151 
This Note proposes that these changes be implemented into civil 
statutes, rather than criminal because the interaction between the criminal 
and civil aspects of rape can cause conflicting policy interests. The State 
has an interest in prosecuting criminals and upholding the law, but these 
criminal law-based goals do not always match the goals of the civil justice 
system. The criminal nature of rape-related pregnancies often blurs the 
distinction between criminal and civil laws, but judges have been quick to 
reiterate that it is improper “to characterize termination of parental rights 
as a criminal proceeding.”152 This overlap is complex because the criminal 
nature of rape is one of the primary justifications for terminating the 
father’s parental rights. In making these determinations, courts must 
focus on the standards applicable to civil situations. Better articulation of 
the standards and increased guidance within the rules for their 
application will help keep the criminal and civil aspects independent. 
It is difficult to draft the perfect statute because it is nearly impossible 
to satisfy all interested groups.153 Implementing a statute containing these 
ideal components, despite being beneficial for society as a whole, could 
face challenges by interest groups and prove difficult to implement. 
However, any changes to these statutes to create better protection for 
 
 150. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (determining an unwed father’s parental rights over his 
biological children). 
 151. Estrich, supra note 12, at 1093. This type of piecemeal approach to changing the treatment of 
a legal issue has been successfully implemented in some states. For example, Alaska took this type of 
approach with domestic violence, making adjustments to the laws in all relevant areas to better 
effectuate the policy goals and outcomes. For a detailed discussion of this type of approach within the 
Alaskan context, see Weithorn, supra note 48, at 1. 
 152. In re Adoption of A.F.M., 15 P.3d 258, 266 (Alaska 2001) (“[P]unitive purpose plays no role 
in adoption proceedings.”). 
 153. See Bitar, supra note 35, at 301 (recognizing that the imperfection of the legal system will 
always create instances where the best situation cannot be protected, “but it should not stop the law 
from searching for the optimal level of justice”). 
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rape victims and their children is preferable to leaving the statutory 
scheme as is—inconsistent in content and among the states. The 
following Subparts propose specific considerations that need to be 
implemented in rape-related pregnancy statutes to properly protect the 
interests at hand. 
A. States Should Adopt a More Inclusive Definition of Rape 
The recent change in the federal definition of rape154 shows an 
expanded and contemporary understanding of rape and recognizes the 
difficulties facing the victims of rape and the need for increased reporting 
and prosecution. Appropriately absent from this definition are the 
elements of “force” or “resistance.”155 The definition also encompasses 
all forms of rape that could result in pregnancy, including marital rape, 
thereby distinguishing rape-related pregnancies and the associated 
parental rights challenges for that child. Although the states are 
independent of the federal government, the federal legislature should 
encourage them to adopt this or a similar definition to promote 
consistency in protecting rape victims and increase public awareness of 
the associated issues. The federal spending powers could provide one 
such method of encouragement by promoting changes to state legislation 
by attaching federal funding to the rape-related pregnancy policies. This 
type of federal influence would be an ideal start toward more uniform 
treatment of rape and its related civil issues. 
B. States Must Implement Laws and Legal Standards for Rape-
Related Pregnancies 
Another major obstacle preventing protections for rape victims is 
that not every state has a statute dealing with rape-related pregnancies. 
Even if the states are unable to adopt matching statutes, all states should 
provide some statutory guidance for the termination of parental rights 
for rape-related pregnancies. Given the complexity of these family 
situations, specific attention and legislative direction is needed. Without 
specialized attention, the courts run the risk of losing sight of the extensive 
interests involved for all parties, blurring policy considerations and even 
allowing the influence of bias into the final determination. States without 
specific legislation for rape-related pregnancies leave it to the courts’ 
determinations of what the proper treatment is, increasing the 
inconsistency and unpredictability of the rulings. 
The new legislation should blend elements of current statutes. To 
begin, states should ensure that marital rape is treated like other forms of 
rape, so that all equal legal remedies are available to all victims. This 
 
 154. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 155. See id.; see also Klarfeld, supra note 15, at 1839. 
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should be accomplished by equalizing statutes of limitation, elements of 
the crime, and sentencing determinations.156 The civil court is equipped to 
make a finding—by clear and convincing evidence—that the child was 
conceived by an act of rape; this judicial forum is sufficient to safeguard 
against abuse of the system and allows innocent fathers a chance to state 
their case.157 After finding conception by rape, there should be a 
presumption against parental rights for the biological father to better 
protect the interests of the mother and child, establishing an obstacle for 
continued exposure to and potential abuse by the rapist. 
Following a finding of rape, the court should apply established legal 
standards to make the final termination of parental rights. The best 
interest of the child standard—prevalent in custody determinations—
should play a strong role in the findings to properly effectuate the interests 
of the child and the State. Another standard that may resonate in these 
determinations is that of intention to become a parent—typically seen in 
surrogacy cases.158 Application of the intent to parent standard could help 
prevent many rapists from being deemed legal parents, particularly 
stranger rapists. The application of this standard to intimate rapists 
becomes complicated, as analogies to unintended but consensual 
pregnancies could be made—just because a pregnancy is unplanned 
between consenting adults does not mean a parent can avoid legal rights 
and obligations. Another limiting factor on the use of this standard is 
that the mother became pregnant through nonconsensual acts, so she 
arguably did not intend to parent either.159 This standard would have 
limited application, and would most likely serve only a limited purpose. 
C. Changes to the Prerequisites for Termination of Parental Rights 
1. Remove the Conviction Requirement 
Current statutes consider a conviction of a parent in the 
determination of parental rights. This conviction should be removed160 
because requiring a conviction not only prevents a large number of 
 
 156. Klarfeld, supra note 15, at 1839. 
 157. This would comport with the due process requirements established by Stanley, as well as 
safeguard against improperly terminating rights by requiring a factual determination on a case-by-case 
analysis. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (due process protections require a hearing on 
parental fitness prior to termination of parental rights). 
 158. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (looking to the intentions of the 
parties to become parents to help determine the legal parents of a child). 
 159. A mother’s decision to keep the child may be sufficient to establish an intention to parent for 
the purposes of this standard, at least strongly enough to be applied against a rapist. 
 160. See Bitar, supra note 35, at 292 (“statutes that require a conviction provide absolutely no 
protection”). 
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victims from receiving civil protections,161 but also effectively imposes a 
high burden of proof onto the parental rights hearings. 
Criminal cases, such as trials for rape, require that findings be made 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” while the prevailing standard for the 
termination of parental rights is the less stringent “clear and convincing” 
standard.162 The criminal standard of proof, while appropriate in criminal 
cases, is not proper for civil determinations of parental rights because 
parental rights hearings are not punitive in nature.163 The clear and 
convincing standard is still an effective means by which to not only permit 
the mothers to be able to prove that they were victims of a crime, but also 
is sufficient to protect the due process rights of the accused fathers.164 
Because conviction rates are low,165 this prerequisite does not adequately 
protect victims of rape and their children; therefore, a court should 
heavily weigh a prior conviction for rape when determining parental 
fitness. An effective mechanism for considerations of conviction is a 
presumption against custody and visitation rights, as seen in Nevada.166 
By creating a presumption rather than a strict requirement, a judicial 
hearing will still be required to determine if said presumption applies in 
specific factual situations. These hearings create an accessible forum for 
mothers to prove why the rights of the rapist should be terminated and, 
at the same time, protect the due process rights of all parties. 
2. Expand Protections Beyond Adoption 
The statutes should also not be limited solely to the consent and 
notification requirements of adoption. More women raise their rape-
conceived children than put the child up for adoption, so the states must 
incorporate this reality in constructing their statutes. Limiting the 
termination of rights to consent and notification for adoption is too 
 
 161. See, e.g., Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and 
Reconceptualizing its Prosecution, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 677, 709 (1996) (“Legislative and prosecutorial 
efforts to combat marital rape will not succeed until pervasive myths about sex, rape, and marriage are 
eradicated from our culture.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) (finding that the interests involved in 
family law proceedings weigh “heavily against the use of the preponderance standard”); In re A.M.D., 
648 P.2d 625, 625 (Colo. 1982) (“[I]n proceedings to terminate parental rights . . . the appropriate 
constitutional standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.”); Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (2013) 
(“A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing 
evidence.”). 
 163. See, e.g., In re Adoption of A.F.M., 15 P.3d at 258, 266 (Alaska 2001). 
 164. See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.A.T., 273 P.3d 813, 819–20 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). Additionally, 
the clear and convincing standard has been upheld for proceedings of custody, and other parental 
rights terminations, so there is no reason why this standard should not apply in the circumstances of 
rape-related pregnancies as well. See supra note 162. 
 165. See supra Part VI.B. 
 166. See Christian Child Placement Serv. of the N.M. Christian Children’s Home v. Vestal, 962 
P.2d 1261 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that criminal conception is not deserving of parental rights to 
the rapist father). 
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restrictive and does not protect the majority of women experiencing a 
rape-related pregnancy.167 Provisions terminating notice and consent 
requirements to adoption are important, however, and should be 
included in any statute controlling rape-related pregnancies. The statutes 
must consider all options available to a pregnant rape victim rather than 
limit protections to adoption.168 There should be some discretion as to the 
termination of custody, visitation rights, or full parental rights and 
obligations, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
3. Leave the Option for Child-Support Obligations Intact 
Courts should also consider be the ability to terminate the parental 
rights of the rapist father, while still enforcing child support obligations 
(should the mother request it), as applied in the Oregon statute.169 
Raising a child alone can be prohibitively expensive, so continued child 
support obligations would provide an opportunity for all women, even 
those of lesser financial means, to choose the option of raising her child 
on her own. Similarly, this may enable some women to leave their 
abusive intimate partners by decreasing the financial dependence 
between the couple. For marital rape, the statutes should follow 
Nevada’s example and establish a presumption specific to marital rape.170 
Upon divorce, if the mother can show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the child was conceived by rape, there should be a rebuttable 
presumption against custody with the abusive father. 
Conclusion 
Despite the beliefs of some persons in our society, rape can and 
does result in pregnancies. Our legislatures—federal or state—should 
consider all of the available data on rape and rape-related pregnancies, 
as well as the interests of the parties involved, and reform the controlling 
statutes by implementing standards that incorporate the more protective 
elements. Rape is a serious crime against the bodily integrity, and in the 
instance of rape-related pregnancies, a presumption should be created in 
favor of the victims, in the form of strong protections against assigning 
parental rights to rapists. 
 
 167. See Bitar, supra note 35, at 291 (discussing the shortcomings of adoption-only statutes). 
 168. As discussed in Part IV.A, the choice of abortion is currently protected by Supreme Court 
doctrine, and thus does not need the same specific protections as adoption and keeping the child. 
 169. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419B.510(2) (2011). 
 170. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125C.210(2) (West 2013). 
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